ΑΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΤΟΝ

Definition

According to the Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon, ἀπροαίρετον is “that which is not subject to choice or moral purpose, indifferent.” The term constitutes a cornerstone of Stoic philosophy, particularly as developed by Epictetus in his «Encheiridion» and «Discourses». It represents the category of things that lie beyond the control of human will and, therefore, cannot be considered good or bad from a moral standpoint.

Stoic doctrine clearly distinguishes between things “up to us” (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, or τὰ προαιρετά) and things “not up to us” (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, or τὰ ἀπροαίρετα). The προαιρετά include our judgments, impulses, desires, and aversions—in short, all that are products of our moral choice (προαίρεσις). Conversely, the ἀπροαίρετα encompass the body, health, wealth, reputation, power, and generally all external circumstances. These latter are considered “indifferent” (ἀδιάφορα) because they possess no inherent moral value and cannot affect a person's virtue or happiness, except through the judgment we assign to them.

Understanding and accepting the nature of the ἀπροαίρετα is crucial for Stoic practice. The attempt to control what is ἀπροαίρετον leads to frustration, anxiety, and unhappiness. Instead, focusing on what is προαιρετόν—that is, on how we react to and judge external events—allows an individual to maintain inner tranquility (ἀταραξία) and live virtuously, regardless of external conditions. The ἀπροαίρετον, therefore, is not merely a description but a guide for the correct attitude towards life.

Main Meanings

1. That which is not subject to our choice — The central Stoic meaning: things “not up to us” (οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), such as the body, health, wealth, reputation, and external circumstances.
2. That which is not subject to will or moral purpose — Refers to matters that cannot be objects of moral judgment or choice by an individual.
3. The indifferent (Stoic concept) — Synonymous with «ἀδιάφορον» in Stoic philosophy, meaning things that are neither inherently good nor bad, but whose value depends on their use.
4. The neutral — That which possesses no intrinsic moral value, being neither good nor bad, but simply existing.
5. The inevitable, the fated — In certain contexts, it can imply what happens unavoidably and cannot be prevented or altered.
6. The involuntary, the unintentional — That which is not done by an individual's will or conscious choice, but occurs independently of it.

Word Family

haire- (root of the verb αἱρέω, meaning “to take, to choose”)

The root haire- (αἱρε-) constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the Ancient Greek vocabulary, producing words related to taking, seizing, but primarily to choosing and preferring. Its semantic flexibility allows for the creation of complex concepts through prefixes and suffixes, covering a wide spectrum from the simple act of choice to deeper ethical and philosophical distinctions. This family is central to understanding human will and action in the ancient world.

In Ancient Texts

Three of the most characteristic passages highlighting the central importance of ἀπροαίρετον in Stoic philosophy, primarily from Epictetus:

The 18 Methods

Applying the 18 traditional lexarithmic methods to the word ΑΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΤΟΝ:

Sources & Bibliography

• Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, H. S. — A Greek-English Lexicon, with a Revised Supplement. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
• Epictetus — Encheiridion. Translated by G. Long. Dover Publications, 2004.
• Epictetus — Discourses. Translated by W. A. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1925.
• Marcus Aurelius — Meditations. Translated by R. Hard. Oxford University Press, 2011.
• Long, A. A. — Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. University of California Press, 1986.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Epictetus. Available online.